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Here are some favorable cases decided in the federal courts for the week of March 22, 2024:
United States v. Oliveras, No. 21-2954, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6226 (2d Cir. Mar. 15, 2024)
The defendant-appellant, Alex Oliveras, was sentenced to sixty-three months’ imprisonment and a three-year supervised release term for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking. On appeal, Oliveras challenged the imposition of a special condition of his supervised release that allowed for suspicionless searches by a probation officer.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the “special needs” doctrine of the Fourth Amendment permits, when sufficiently supported by the record, the imposition of a special condition of supervised release that allows suspicionless searches of the defendant’s person, property, vehicle, place of residence, or any other property under their control by a probation officer. However, the court also found that the district court exceeded its discretion in imposing that special condition here. The court explained that the district court failed to make the individualized assessment required to support the special condition under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), including a sufficient explanation as to how the condition was reasonably related in this particular case to the applicable statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and involved no greater deprivation of liberty than was reasonably necessary under those factors. Therefore, the Court of Appeals vacated the Search Condition and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of whether it is necessary to impose the Search Condition in this particular case and, if so, for the district court to explain the individualized basis for imposing the Search Condition.
United States v. Richardson, No. 22-6748, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6618 (4th Cir. Mar. 20, 2024)
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit considered whether a district court can reduce a sentence for both covered and noncovered offenses under the First Step Act if they were sentenced as a package. The defendant, Nathaniel Richardson, was originally sentenced to two concurrent terms of life imprisonment for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine and heroin and for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise. After the passage of the First Step Act, Richardson sought a sentence reduction. The district court reduced the sentence for the crack cocaine distribution offense but left the sentence for the continuing criminal enterprise offense undisturbed.
The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court has the discretion to reduce both covered and noncovered offenses under the First Step Act if they function as a package. The court reasoned that since district judges often sentence on multiple counts as an interconnected process, they should be given the discretion to reconfigure the sentencing plan to ensure it remains adequate to satisfy the statutory sentencing factors. The court further noted that the sentencing package doctrine is applicable here because when one count of a package is remanded, the district judge must be given the discretion to review the efficacy of what remains in light of the original plan. The case was remanded for the district court to decide whether the counts functioned as a package, and if so, to resentence accordingly.
United States v. Lassiter, No. 22-4147, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6257 (4th Cir. Mar. 15, 2024)
This case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, where the defendant, Malek Lassiter, appealed his convictions for possessing a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Lassiter argued that his convictions were erroneous due to a change in legal authority in the form of the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Taylor which altered the definition of a “crime of violence”.
Lassiter’s convictions were based on attempted murder in aid of racketeering activity, arguing that this did not constitute a crime of violence in light of the Taylor decision. However, the court disagreed, distinguishing between the requirements for attempted Hobbs Act robbery, which was the focus of the Taylor case, and murder, asserting that murder requires the use of force, therefore attempted murder necessarily requires the attempted use of force, fitting within the definition of a crime of violence.
The court rejected Lassiter’s arguments and affirmed his § 924(c)(1)(A) convictions. However, due to an inconsistency between the oral and written descriptions of one of Lassiter’s supervised-release conditions, the court vacated his sentence in its entirety and remanded the case for a full resentencing.
United States v. Santiago, No. 23-30149, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6774 (5th Cir. Mar. 21, 2024)
In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, the defendant, Clarence Santiago, appealed both his conviction and sentence related to drug trafficking and firearms charges. Santiago and his co-conspirators were selling marijuana from a hotel room when they were robbed at gunpoint by previous buyers, leading to a shootout. Santiago was apprehended and confessed to his involvement in the crime.
Santiago pleaded guilty to four separate charges but later moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that the presentence investigation report recommended he be improperly punished for attempted first-degree murder. The district court sentenced Santiago to 360 months, a decision he appealed on multiple grounds.
The Court of Appeals found no reversible error in Santiago’s plea but held that the district court erred in calculating the guideline range for sentencing. The court noted that Santiago and his co-conspirators were under threat during the shootout, which may have been an act of self-defense rather than attempted murder.
Given this, the Court of Appeals found that the district court committed clear error by applying an attempted-murder cross-reference without considering Santiago’s potential self-defense. The court affirmed Santiago’s conviction but vacated the sentence and remanded the case for resentencing.
United States v. Alvarado, No. 22-5459, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 6410 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 2024)
The case involved Ricardo Alvarado, who was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). His crime was reported by officers who responded to a call that a man was carrying what appeared to be a machine gun in a mobile home park. Alvarado was found with a Ruger AR-556 semi-automatic rifle, and upon investigation, officers discovered that he had two prior felony convictions. He was sentenced to 104 months’ imprisonment, including a four-level sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment.
Alvarado appealed his conviction and sentence. He contended that his conviction violated the Second Amendment based on the standard articulated in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, an issue he raised for the first time on appeal. He also argued that the evidence did not support a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed Alvarado’s conviction but vacated his sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The court found that the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) under Bruen was subject to reasonable dispute and would not disturb Alvarado’s conviction on plain error review. However, the court found that the district court erred in applying a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment. Without record evidence of anyone in proximity to Alvarado’s line of fire, or otherwise facing an imminent risk of harm, the Government could not satisfy Tennessee’s zone of danger requirement. Consequently, Alvarado’s sentence was vacated.
Barnett v. United States, No. 23-5915, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 5107 (6th Cir. Mar. 1, 2024)
COA Granted on Whether Equitable Tolling Should Apply to Elderly Prisoner Filing a Late 2255 Motion: “Barnett argues that the one-year deadline should be tolled because he is 84-years-old, poorly educated, and nearly illiterate such that he had to rely on other inmates to look at his paperwork to raise any issue for relief. Barnett’s age, lack of education, and illiteracy make his reliance on fellow inmates markedly different from the average pro se litigant. Moreover, Barnett was operating under the belief that his petition would be second or successive (and, therefore, was not subject to the one-year statute of limitations) because he had filed previous § 2255 petitions. Indeed, he originally filed his petition in this court as a request for authorization under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). We transferred the filing to the district court because it was based on a new judgment and was therefore not second or successive. And, despite not learning of the deadline until after filing, Barnett’s petition was only five days late.”
